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EVIDENCE-STATUTORY RAPE-RrGHT OF AccusBD TO COMPULSORY BLOOD 
TEST OF PROSECUTRIX AND CmLn-Defendant was convicted of statutory rape 
on the strength of complaining witness' uncorroborated testimony. Testimony 
of the prosecutrix was to the effect that she had had sexual relations with de-
fendant only once, that she had become pregnant and had given birth to a child 
prior to the trial, and that she had had sexual relations with no other men. 
Defendant moved for an order requiring that blood tests be taken of the child 
and the mother. The motion was denied. On appeal, held, affirmed. Assuming 
power, absent statute, to compel the taking of blood-grouping tests, the trial 
court did not err since defendant did not offer to submit himself to the test and 
without him the tests could prov~ nothing. Furthermore, the record did not 
reveal the date of birth, present existence of, or jurisdiction of the court over, 
the child. State v. Eli, (N.D. 1954) 62 N.W. (2d) 469. 
''In one specific biological trait, viz. blood-groups, scientific opinion is now 
in accord in accepting the fact that there is a causative relation between the 
trait of the progenitor and the trait of the progeny.''1 However, "this trait can 
be used only negatively, i.e. to evidence that a particular man P is not the 
father of a particular child C."2 The courts are not in accord as to the power 
to compel the taking of these tests. There seems to be sufficient authority 
recognizing judicial power, in civil cases, to compel the parties to submit to the 
ordinary type of physical examinations. 3 The South Dakota court recognized 
that a blood-grouping test may be ordered in an appropriate case although an 
order for such test was denied because of scientific uncertainty at that time.4 
A lower New York court also had no difficulty in recognizing such judicial 
power,5 but this opinion was reversed by the appellate division.6 An Ohio 
11 WmMoRB, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §165a, p. 610 (1940). 
2lbid. 
3 See 15 L.R.A. (n.s.) 663 (1908). 
4 State v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7 (1933). See also 163 A.L.R. 939 at 
943 (1946). 
5 Beuschel v. Monowitz, 151 Misc. 899, 271 N.Y.S. 277 (1934). 
6 241 App. Div. 888 (1934). The court felt that such power was lacking since the 
child was not a party to the action (civil action for carnal abuse) and would not benefit 
from the test. This is a questionable conclusion since a witness is often not a party to the 
action. Appeal was denied on grounds of a non-final order. 265 N.Y. 509, 193 N.E. 295 
(1934). 
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court, in ordering a blood test in a bastardy proceeding, 7 said, "The absence 
of statutory authority is not conclusive. On the other hand, the Legislature 
has not undertaken to limit the court in exercise of such power."8 The Dela-
ware Supreme Court affirmed the granting of a motion by a defendant accused 
of statutory rape to order a physical examination of the prosecuting witness,9 
and the same has been done by the Oklahoma court.10 These decisions demon-
strate an awareness of the necessity of obtaining and introducing evidence 
which bears on the truth.11 If the state can subject witnesses to the in-
convenience of attending trials in the first instance, it is strangely inconsistent 
to deny to it the right to elicit pertinent testimony by applying to them reason-
able physical tests. Measures which are more drastic than blood extraction 
are often resorted to by courts, as when witnesses are jailed to avoid Bight, or 
plaintiffs are physically examined in personal injury actions, or sensitivity tests 
are applied to plaintiffs claiming paralysis.12 Despite these parallels, there is 
still a reluctance to utilize blood-grouping tests. Such indisposition on the part 
of the courts seems unwananted. The test itself is harmless and virtually pain-
less. A properly supervised blood test should easily surmount the constitutional 
barriers conjured up by its opponents.13 One might expect that a court would 
welcome all useful evidence, especially in trials for rape, where the word of 
the complaining witness often constitutes the sole evidence for the state, and 
where a conviction may spell disaster for the defendant The principal case 
epitomized the point. Had defendant's motion been granted, he might have 
succeeded in establishing non-paternity in direct contradiction to positive asser-
tions by the prosecutrix. This, of itself, would not prove that defendant, did 
not have sexual intercourse with prosecutrix, but it would serve to impeach her 
credibility very seriously. If the blood tests proved non-paternity, the jury 
7 State ex rel. Van Camp v. Welling, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 448, 3 Ohio Supp. 333 (1936). 
8 Id. at 450. Said the court, "It is our view that the granting of this order comes 
within the inherent power of the court." Ibid. The court felt the issue was procedural 
instead of substantive. See also State v. Damm, 64 S.D. 309 at 315, 266 N.W. 667 
(1933): "It is our position that a statute can neither add to nor detract from the inherent 
powers of the court in such a matter." 
9 State v. Pucca, 20 Del. 71, 55 A. 831 (1902). 
lOWalker v. State, 12 Okla. Cr. 179, 153 P. 209 (1915). In State v. Driver, 88 
W.Va. 479, 107 S.E. 189 (1921), the court expressed doubt as to the authority to compel 
an examination without the female's consent. Professor Wigmore has said that "the ruling 
is fundamentally unsound, and especially for cases of sexual offenses of any sort." 8 
WxcMoRE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 170n. (1940). 
11 See 8 WxcMORE, EvmENcE, 3d ed., §2216 (1940). 
12 23 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. RBv. 156 at 160 (1948). " .•• of the jurisdictions which have 
had the opportunity to pass upon the subject, (Calif., Conn., Fla., Me., Md., Mass., N.J., 
N.Y., Ohio, Pa., S.D., Wis., and the Dist. of Col.), only Penn. and N.Y. have refused to 
order the tests without a statute." Id. at 161. See Lee, ''Blood Tests for Paternity," 12 
A.B.A.J. 441 (1926). 
13 See generally, 8 WxcMoRE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§2194, 2216, 2220, 2265 (1940). 
See also Maguire, "A Survey of Blood Group Decisions and Legislation in the American 
Law of Evidence," 16 So. CAL. L. RBv. 161 (1943). But cf. Schock, "Determination of 
Paternity by Blood-Grouping Tests: The European Experience," 16 So. CAL. L. RBv. 177 
at 187 (1943). 
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would have good cause to question the reliability of prosecutrix' testimony, 
or, if the jury believed her testimony that she had engaged only once in sexual 
intercourse, and the blood tests proved non-paternity, then defendant would be 
acquitted. The court attempted to justify the denial of defendant's motion on 
very technical grounds, viz., that defendant did not offer himself to be tested, 
nor did he show the date of birth of the child or its present existence and 
jurisdictional status. Surely these determinations could have been made with 
ease had the appellate court been willing to face the real issue-whether the 
trial court had power to order the tests-and conclude it affirmatively. Such 
resort to technicalities on the part of an appellate court evidences a lack of desire 
to settle a very important issue. 
Edward Pastucha, S.Ed. 
